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Red Cross granted punitive damage immunity for
HIV-infected blood transfusion
by Raquel Villanueva

In Barton v.American Red
Cross, 826 F. Supp. 407 (M.D. Ala.
1993), an United States district court
held that a patient suing the Red
Cross, the Southeast Alabama
Medical Center, and two doctors for
negligence and wanton failure to
screen properly for HIV-infected
blood was not entitled to reinstatement of dismissed claims. The court
further held that the Red Cross was
immune from the patient's punitive
damages claim for failure to
adequately screen for contaminated
blood. The court denied the patient's
motion for reinstatement of claims
against defendants and granted the
Red Cross' motion to strike the
claim for punitive damages.
On July 24, 1988, Plaintiff
R.A. Barton ("Barton"), a patient of
defendant Dr. Moore, received a
blood transfusion at the Southeast
Alabama Medical Center ("Medical
Center"). The blood was supplied by
a Red Cross volunteer donor.
Defendant Dr. McGowan supervised
the Red Cross procedures for
screening blood from volunteer
donors. On June 9, 1990, the Red
Cross discovered that the blood
transfused to Barton had tested
positive for HIV. However, the Red
Cross did not notify the Medical
Center until December 13, 1990.
After Barton received notification of
the contaminated blood on January
3, 1991, she took a blood test and
was later informed by Dr. Moore
that she had tested positive for HIV.
Barton's blood was again
1995-1996

tested using the more sophisticated
Western blot test to confirm the
results. Although it is uncertain
when Barton was informed of her
Western blot results, the laboratory
report, dated on January 12, 1991,
stated that the results should be
available within seven days. A letter
to Dr. Moore from a Dr. Coe, dated
January 23, 1991, indicated that
Barton's HIV status had been
confirmed. However, Barton alleged
that she could not have known of the
results before January 20, 1991, and
believed that Dr. Coe's office orally
informed her of the Western blot
results on January 22, 1991.

Patient seeks relief under
the Alabama Medical
Liability Act
On July 18, 1991, Barton,
including her husband and two sons,
sued the Red Cross, the Medical
Center, Dr. Moore, and Dr.
McGowan for negligent and wanton
failure to screen properly for HIVinfected blood. Barton sought relief
under the Alabama Medical Liability
Act ("AMLA") and brought a
punitive damages claim against the
Red Cross. The court granted the
motion to dismiss filed by the
Medical Center and Dr. Moore
based on AMLA's statute of limitations. Subsequently, the Red Cross
and Dr. McGowan removed the case
to federal court and moved for
summary judgment, asserting that

AMLA's statute of limitations and
claim preclusion barred Barton's
claims. The district court denied this
motion, finding that the state court's
dismissal of the claims against the
Medical Center and Dr. Moore was
not a final order. The court also
found that the precise timing of
Barton's discovery of her cause of
action was a question of fact for the
jury. Thus, the only remaining issues
to be decided by the district court
were Barton's motion to reinstate
claims against the defendants and
the Red Cross' motion to strike the
claim for punitive damages.
The AMLA requires that an
action be brought within two years
after the act giving rise to the claim
occurs. If a cause of action could not
reasonably have been discovered
within this period, AMLA allows the
plaintiff to file the action within six
months from either the date of
discovery of the cause of action or
the date of discovery of facts
reasonably leading to discovery of
the cause of action. Barton contended that her failure to commence
her suit within the two year statutory
period did not bar her claim because
she discovered her cause of action
after January 18, 1991, which fell
within the six month statutory
period. The Defendants countered
that Barton failed to assert this date
of discovery issue before the state
court and also waited sixteen months
to move for reinstatement. Therefore, reinstatement would be unfair.
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Court denies reinstatement
of claims against doctor and
Medical Center
The district court stated
that Barton's motion to reinstate was
really a request for reconsideration
of the state court's dismissal. On a
motion to reconsider, the courts
usually refuse to hear evidence not
within the movant's knowledge at
the time of the prior decision. The
district court agreed with the
defendants, finding that the plaintiffs did not present their date of
discovery argument before the state
court. Barton only had asserted that
Dr. Moore and the Medical Center
should be estopped from using the
statute of limitations defense since
they had caused the delay. Furthermore, the district court stated that
Barton neither asserted the date she
discovered her cause of action nor
presented evidence concerning the
need for the confirmation test.
Therefore, the state court did not
estop the defendants from pursuing
their statute of limitation defense.
Barton's failure to show that the
state court erred led the district court
to deny reconsideration of the state
court's finding.
Barton responded to the
Red Cross' and to Dr. McGowan's
motion for summary judgment by
presenting her own affidavit
testimony, which stated that she did
not receive her final test result until
January 20, 1991. Barton maintained
that she could not have learned of
facts leading to discovery of her
cause of action until that date.
However, because Barton did not
provide a reasonable explanation for
her failure to make this argument
before the state court, the district
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court refused to consider her
affidavit testimony in deciding the
motion to reinstate. Moreover,
although Barton claimed that the
defendants fraudulently concealed
the donor's HIV- positive status for
six months, she did not allege that
the defendants prevented her from
presenting the date of discovery
argument. Thus, the district court
found that Barton's lack of knowledge would not have prevented her
from stating the date of discovery
claim.
Contrary to Barton's
contention that she moved for
reinstatement within a reasonable
time, the district court found that she
could have moved to reconsider
once the case was removed to
federal court. Even if Barton had
waited until the state court decided
the motion for summary judgment,
she waited an additional two and a
half months to file the motion to
reinstate without an explanation.
Finally, Barton did not present
reasons why justice would require
the district court to grant the motion
to reinstate under Federal Rule 60
(b)(6). Equity would weigh in favor
of denying Barton's motion because
of her failure to explain why she did
not raise the date of discovery issue
and why she delayed seeking
reconsideration. Therefore, the
district court denied the motion to
reinstate.

Court denies punitive
damages claim against Red
Cross
Barton recognized the Red
Cross' status as a federal instrumentality but did not believe it was
entitled to punitive damages

immunity. She then brought an
action against the Red Cross for
punitive and compensatory damages, claiming that public policy
should exempt the Red Cross from
punitive damage immunity. In
support of this contention, Barton
maintained that the Red Cross has a
public health and safety function to
ensure the safe supply of blood.
Barton alleged that the Red Cross
failed to exercise due care in
screening blood and waited six
months to inform her of the HIVinfected blood. She also suggested
that the need to protect the public
welfare should be balanced against
the need of federal instrumentalities
to conduct business. Punitive
damages should be imposed to deter
the Red Cross from endangering the
public health and safety.
Rejecting the public health
and safety function argument
advanced by Barton, the district
court reasoned that Congress did not
express a need for an exception to
punitive damage immunity. Congress could have created such an
exemption in the federal
instrumentality's charter if it had
intended an exemption. Furthermore, the district court emphasized
that even the Federal Tort Claims
Act did not create an exception for
government employees responsible
for the public health and safety. 28
U.S.C.A. § 2674.
Finally, the district court
also rejected Barton's suggestion
that the need for protecting the
public welfare should be weighed
against the need of federal instrumentalities to conduct business.
Therefore, the district court granted
the Red Cross' motion to strike the
claim for punitive damages.
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